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The Hon. Bruce Atkinson MLC The Hon. Ken Smith MP 
President Speaker 
Legislative Council Legislative Assembly 
Parliament House Parliament House 
Melbourne Melbourne 
 
Dear Presiding Officers 
 
Under the provisions of section 16AB of the Audit Act 1994, I transmit my report WoVG 
Information Security Management Framework.  
The audit examined 11 public sector agencies and found that the policy, standards and 
protection mechanisms for the security of the state’s information and communications 
technology (ICT) systems and data have not been effectively applied. Agencies 
undertake only limited monitoring of suspicious internal network activity, and they do 
not have a capability to detect an intrusion into sensitive public sector systems.  
I also found that if there was an external cyber attack or a cyber alert issued by an 
Australian Government national security agency, there would be no coordinated 
understanding of the threat or its impact across the state’s public sector ICT systems, 
because central agencies do not conduct follow-up actions after a cyber alert is 
disseminated.  
During the course of this audit, I identified a number of critical- and medium-level risks 
related to individual agency systems that I have raised with each of those agencies 
through individual management letters. I have reached agreement with each agency 
about what actions will be implemented and a proposed time frame for implementation.  
Given the ongoing implications of these issues for ICT security, I intend to closely 
monitor the completion of these actions and may report their status to Parliament at a 
later date. 
Yours faithfully 
John Doyle 
Auditor-General 
27 November 2013  
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Auditor-General’s comments 
The public sector is increasingly reliant on information and communications 
technology (ICT) to deliver services, monitor performance, and respond quickly and 
comprehensively to emerging issues and risks. However, around the world, ICT 
networks are being threatened by the increasing rate, scale and sophistication of 
cyber attacks.  
This means that effective security of ICT systems is more critical than ever to 
ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of public sector data, information 
and services. It requires individual agency vigilance in monitoring and addressing 
system security threats, as well as broader central oversight of the extent to which 
public sector systems are able to resist cyber attack and to follow up on the status 
of emerging or known cyber threats. 
Disappointingly, I found that to date there has been inadequate central oversight of 
the ability of public sector systems to resist cyber attack and the follow up of the 
status of emerging or known cyber threats. Also, there are no cohesive 
arrangements in place in Victoria to brief ministers if a major cyber threat was to 
affect the public sector’s ability to continue to deliver services. 
The government has very recently made two announcements that are likely to start 
to address these deficiencies: 
x On 31 October 2013 the Emergency Management Bill 2013 was introduced 
into Parliament which proposes that a new State Crisis and Resilience Council 
will be established, designating key leadership roles to the Department of 
State Development, Business and Innovation, and the Department of Premier 
and Cabinet to analyse the cyber threat and comprehensively brief 
government on cyber incidents. 
x In recent days, the government has also announced its intention to develop a 
new cyber security strategy which proposes to clarify lines of accountability 
and governance structures for cyber security within the Victorian public sector. 
Both of these developments show that the government is making efforts to tackle 
the poor cyber security situation that currently exists in the Victorian public sector. 
However, the effectiveness of the implementation of these initiatives will be critical 
to their success in addressing the serious issues and vulnerabilities detected by 
this audit. 
As part of this audit, we examined a relatively small number of critical systems 
across government. Overall, the audit found there was a low level of awareness of 
how each agency’s ICT systems would likely perform if subjected to a cyber attack. 
We undertook penetration tests of selected ICT systems which identified well over 
100 breaches and lapses in information security practice.  
John Doyle 
Auditor-General 
Audit team
Paul O’Connor 
Sector Director 
Wayne Singleton 
Team Leader 
Annie Skelton 
Analyst 
Kudrat Gill 
Analyst 
Ray Winn 
Engagement Quality 
Control Reviewer 
Auditor-General’s comments 
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While it is not in the public interest to publicly disclose my detailed findings, I have 
written separately to each of the agencies subject to this audit and sought their 
urgent attention in rectifying these issues. I am pleased to say that a number of the 
more critical findings have already been addressed by some agencies, and I have 
been advised of the practical time frames for addressing the remainder. I will be 
monitoring the implementation of those actions very closely. 
More broadly, the results of this audit should serve as an important reminder to all 
government departments and agencies of the need to remain vigilant in monitoring 
and testing of the security of their ICT systems. 
 
 
John Doyle 
Auditor-General 
November 2013 
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Audit summary 
Background 
Information security is critical to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
public sector data, information and services. 
Security risks for information and communications technology (ICT) systems have 
significantly increased in recent years. Around the world, there have been 
unprecedented and escalating external threats to information security for both public 
and private sector ICT systems, commonly referred to as cyber threats. 
This audit focused on whether information security policy and standards have been 
appropriately implemented across Whole-of-Victorian-Government (WoVG) agencies 
and whether systems are capable of resisting cyber attacks and protecting public 
sector information in a hostile environment.  
Currently, the published information security policy and framework applies only to 
20 Victorian Government agencies, referred to in this report as ‘inner WoVG agencies’. 
There is no requirement for any ‘outer WoVG agency’ to conform to any specific policy 
or standard.  
To assess the effectiveness of the state’s ICT security policy, standards and protection 
mechanisms, this audit examined whether:  
x appropriate information security policy direction and guidance was in place to 
provide consistent protection to state ICT systems and data 
x central agencies had oversight of, and coordinated responses to, information and 
system threats 
x selected agencies had established and complied with information security policy 
and standards. 
VAGO appointed an independent specialist information security advisor to assist in 
reviewing whether the information security policy, standards and processes that 
agencies have in place comply with mandated government standards. 
Under VAGO’s supervision, the specialist information security advisor also conducted 
internal and external penetration testing—a method of testing for vulnerabilities within 
an ICT system—of selected agency ICT systems. 
This audit examined 11 agencies: 
x Seven agencies were inner WoVG agencies, defined in the Department of State 
Development, Business and Innovation (DSDBI) information security procedures 
as ‘WoVG’. 
x Four agencies were outer WoVG agencies, defined in DSDBI’s information 
security procedures as ‘non-WoVG’. 
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Conclusions 
Agencies have not effectively implemented Victorian Government information security 
policy and standards. Agencies are potentially exposed to cyber attacks, primarily 
because of inadequate ICT security controls and immature operational processes. 
The current information security policy has not been endorsed by government and 
there are no current arrangements to brief ministers if a major cyber threat affects the 
public sector’s ability to deliver services. This position may be addressed by the 
Emergency Management Bill 2013 which was introduced into Parliament on 
31 October 2013.   
The application and coverage of the government’s information security policy and 
standards should be reviewed. While the content of the mandated information security 
procedures is appropriate, it applies only to inner WoVG agencies. The remaining 
outer WoVG agencies—of which there are more than 500—are not required to 
conform to any specific policy or standard. Four of the outer WoVG agencies reviewed 
as part of this audit are responsible for significant sources of state revenue, and control 
billions of dollars of financial assets, yet are not covered by the policy and standards. 
The lack of any specific information security guidance for outer WoVG agencies 
conflicts with recommendations made by VAGO in our 2009 audit, Maintaining the 
Integrity and Confidentiality of Personal Information. This is despite the Department of 
Treasury and Finance (DTF) and the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) 
accepting those recommendations. 
Government relies on central agencies to provide it with appropriate and timely 
information about the status of cyber threats and the ability of systems to resist cyber 
attack. However, in Victoria there is no central coordination or reporting in place. 
In particular: 
x DPC has no role in coordinating a whole-of-government approach to cyber 
threats, as this is the responsibility of individual departments and agencies 
x agencies experiencing serious cyber incidents report these to the Australian 
Signals Directorate but not to DSDBI or DPC 
x central agencies do not seek to be informed of external cyber incidents detected 
by Australian Government security agencies and do not follow up actions taken 
after a cyber alert is disseminated. 
DSDBI and individual agencies are not managing internet protocol (IP) information to 
make sure correct and current information is available to help cyber threat response. 
All the audited agencies had previously conducted penetration testing on their ICT 
systems. Some of these tests were too narrowly scoped and there were multiple 
instances where previously identified problems were not being remediated. 
Overall, agencies had a low level of awareness of how their ICT systems would be 
likely to perform if subjected to a cyber attack. 
Audit summary 
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Findings 
Agencies to which the information security policy applies 
While the content of the information security policy and standards is appropriate, it only 
applies to the 20 inner WoVG agencies. Information security policy and standards 
should also apply to outer WoVG agencies operating ICT systems that have an 
aggregate high transactional value critical to state revenue, systems critical to public 
safety, or systems holding sensitive personal data with potential value to third parties. 
The lack of any specific information security guidance for outer WoVG agencies 
conflicts with the recommendations made in the 2009 VAGO report, Maintaining the 
Integrity and Confidentiality of Personal Information. These were accepted by DTF and 
DPC, but have not been fully implemented. 
Victoria’s public sector information security framework 
Recommendations in VAGO's 2009 audit report were the impetus for developing a 
suite of Victorian information security policy and standards. These were informed by 
existing Australian Government information security standards.  
The Victorian policy and standards were developed by DTF and released in late 2012.  
The standards require inner WoVG agencies to develop their own information security 
management framework (ISMF), which is to be based on the policy and standards. 
This includes annual reporting requirements on the status of information security within 
the agency, and an assessment of its ability to withstand a cyber attack. 
Individual agency ISMFs were reasonably well developed for inner WoVG agencies, 
but their annual reports were unsatisfactory and did not reflect a credible and realistic 
threat, partly because the report template was not exhaustive. 
Compliance with standards 
Central agencies do not provide any guidance to assist outer WoVG agencies and 
these agencies are therefore less advanced with their information security policies and 
frameworks.  
Only one of the four outer WoVG agencies selected for this audit had considered 
existing government policy and standards. However, all had considered the ISO 27000 
series of international information security standards as a reference when developing 
their respective information security policies. 
Although DTF was required to oversee agency implementation of each agency’s ISMF, 
we found little evidence of any oversight of agency standards, controls or compliance. 
Audit summary 
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Top 4 Strategies to Mitigate Targeted Cyber Intrusions 
The Victorian Government’s information security standards require inner WoVG 
agencies to implement the Australian Signals Directorate’s Top 4 Strategies to Mitigate 
Targeted Cyber Intrusions, which are likely to prevent at least 85 per cent of attacks.  
We found that all four strategies were poorly implemented within both the inner and 
outer WoVG agencies examined.  
All agencies had undertaken penetration testing of their ICT systems but there was 
little evidence that they tested all of their systems and there were multiple instances of 
testing being too narrowly scoped. Most commonly, agencies did not maintain software 
patches adequately and continued to operate unsupported and therefore vulnerable 
systems. 
No coordinated view of cyber threats 
We found that there is no central view of the overall Victorian cyber threat situation nor 
are there arrangements in place to brief government in the event of a multi-agency or 
sustained cyber attack.   
Previously DPC advised that it did not have a role in coordinating a 
whole-of-government approach to cyber threats and that individual agencies are 
responsible for their own information security arrangements. However, DPC has 
subsequently advised that this will change with the Emergency Management Bill 2013 
which was introduced into Parliament on 31 October 2013. The Bill confirms the 
establishment of the State Crisis and Resilience Council (SCRC) which was formed in 
April 2013 in anticipation of the Bill passing. Membership of the SCRC comprises all 
departmental secretaries and is chaired by the Secretary of the Department of Premier 
and Cabinet. Briefings on cyber threats will be made to the SCRC by DSDBI and the 
SCRC will in turn recommend briefings for ministers as appropriate. 
Overall, awareness of how ICT systems would perform while under cyber attack was 
unsatisfactory.   
Closer central agency involvement is critical to managing this gap until public sector 
agencies have achieved an acceptable level of maturity in ICT processes. 
  
Audit summary 
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Recommendations  
Many of the detailed findings arising from fieldwork for this audit are sensitive to the 
security of public sector ICT systems and it is therefore not in the public interest to 
include them in this report. 
However, to make sure that agencies take appropriate steps to address observed 
weaknesses and breaches, the Auditor-General has issued management letters to 
each agency subject to this audit. The letters set out recommended actions and seek a 
response from the agencies indicating their acceptance, as well as their intended 
remediation actions and time frames. 
This audit has identified 58 significant information security issues which are 
categorised as follows: 
x Critical level—nine issues in three agencies—these are high-level information 
security risks which require an urgent assessment of the risk and implementation 
of mitigating controls. 
x Medium level—49 issues in six agencies—these are moderate- or long-term 
information security risks which should be assessed and have mitigating controls 
implemented as soon as possible. 
VAGO will periodically examine whether these findings are being remediated over an 
acceptable time frame and may, at its discretion, report to Parliament at a later date on 
progress. 
Number Recommendation Page 
 The Department of State Development, Business and Innovation 
should: 
 
1. send the information security management policy to government for 
formal consideration 
13 
2. amend information security policy and standards to include those outer 
WoVG agencies operating information and communications technology 
systems that have an aggregate high transaction value critical to state 
revenue, systems critical to public safety, or systems holding sensitive 
personal data with potential value to third parties 
13 
3. require WoVG agencies to report any variations between the information 
security standards and their agency information security management 
frameworks, that have been approved by their agency head, as part of 
the annual information security management framework 
self-assessment reporting process 
13 
4. require that each agency information security management framework 
self-assessment report includes a statement of compliance addressing 
all self-assessment report deficiencies 
13 
5. develop processes for outer WoVG agencies to be included in relevant 
briefings and information security forums, and to be provided with 
advice and assistance outside of the WoVG Chief Information Officers 
Council 
13 
6. improve the current information security management framework 
self-assessment report template to ensure a more comprehensive 
outcome. 
13 
Audit summary 
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Recommendations – continued 
Number Recommendation Page 
 Departments and agencies included in this audit should:  
7. take a more rigorous approach to completing their annual information 
security management framework self-assessment report 
13 
8. make sure their annual self-assessment reports reflect the true status 
and risk to agency business from any third party service provider they 
may use. 
13 
 The Department of Premier and Cabinet, and the Department of State 
Development, Business and Innovation should: 
 
9. confirm their respective roles and responsibilities for information security 
once the Emergency Management Bill 2013 is enacted 
19 
10. confirm that briefings on cyber threats will be made to the State Crisis 
and Resilience Council by the Department of State Development, 
Business and Innovation as the agency with primary responsibility for 
WoVG information and communications technology, and that the State 
Crisis and Resilience Council will in turn recommend briefings for 
ministers as appropriate. 
19 
 The Department of State Development, Business and Innovation 
should: 
 
11. arrange for a cyber alert subscription service to be available to every 
government agency from a suitable provider 
19 
12. develop and implement a process for maintaining a register of all IP 
addresses in use by public sector departments and agencies. 
19 
 Departments and agencies included in this audit should:  
13. implement appropriate action to maintain the accuracy of their IP 
address information with the Asia-Pacific National Internet Centre. 
19 
 All public sector agencies in Victoria should:  
14. review the Australian Signals Directorate Top 4 Strategies to Mitigate 
Targeted Cyber Intrusions, and implement these practices as a matter of 
urgency 
28 
15. retain responsibility for managing and allocating passwords if third party 
service providers are used 
28 
16. review the patching guidelines published on the Australian Signals 
Directorate’s website and develop, implement or review their patching 
strategy. 
28 
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Submissions and comments received 
In addition to progressive engagement during the course of the audit, in accordance 
with section 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994, a copy of this report was provided to the 
following departments and agencies with a request for submissions or comments: 
x CenITex 
x Department of Human Services 
x Department of Justice 
x Department of Premier and Cabinet 
x Department of State Development, Business and Innovation 
x Department of Treasury and Finance 
x State Revenue Office 
x Transport Accident Commission 
x Treasury Corporation of Victoria 
x Victorian Funds Management Corporation 
x WorkSafe Victoria. 
Agency views have been considered in reaching our audit conclusions and are 
represented to the extent relevant and warranted in preparing this report. Their full 
section 16(3) submissions and comments are included in Appendix A. 
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1 Background 
1.1 Information security overview 
Information and communications technology (ICT) has fundamentally changed the way 
that the public sector operates. 
Today, the government and public sector relies heavily on ICT to effectively deliver 
services to the Victorian community and to efficiently manage its own internal activities. 
However, ICT systems have inherent and significant risks, and external and internal 
threats to information security and privacy are increasing. 
1.1.1 Information security policy and standards 
Globally, information security policy and standards are based on the International 
Organisation for Standardisation ISO 27000 series of standards. These provide best 
practice recommendations on risks and controls within the context of an overall 
information security management system. 
The Australian Government has also provided comprehensive policy and standards for 
Commonwealth departments and agencies: 
x The Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) provides appropriate controls 
for the Australian Government to protect its people, information and assets, at 
home and overseas. The PSPF is managed by the Federal Attorney-General's 
Department. 
x The Information Security Manual (ISM), which is the standard governing the 
security of Australian Government ICT systems and complements the PSPF. The 
ISM is managed by the Australian Signals Directorate. 
1.2 Victorian Government cyber threat response 
In November 2009, VAGO tabled a performance audit report on Maintaining the 
Integrity and Confidentiality of Personal Information. The findings from this report 
largely set the subsequent agenda for information security within the state government. 
In October 2009, the Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF) developed a new 
suite of Whole-of-Victorian-Government (WoVG) information security policy, standards 
and processes, aligned with the Australian Government framework and manual. 
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These new policy and standards apply to only 20 agencies and were communicated 
through the following key documents: 
x SEC POL 01: Information Security Management Policy  
x SEC STD 01: Information Security Management Framework 
x SEC STD 02: Critical Information Infrastructure Risk Management.  
In this audit we have referred to these 20 agencies as inner WoVG agencies. 
The cyber threat to Victoria is real. According to the Cyber Security Operations Centre 
(CSOC) Cyber Intrusion Activity Report dated August 2013: Australian State and 
Territory Governments: January–June 2013: 
‘Between January and June 2013, there were approximately 40 cyber 
security incidents affecting state and territory governments. Of these 
40 incidents, approximately 35 were considered serious enough to require 
further action and a CSOC response. The networks of the Victorian and 
West Australian state governments accounted for the highest proportion 
of cyber security incidents responded to by the CSOC between January 
and June 2013.’ 
  Figure 1A
Total cyber security incidents in Australia 
detected by or reported to the Cyber Security Operations Centre 
Year 
Total incidents detected by  
or reported to CSOC 
Total incidents requiring a 
heightened response by CSOC 
2011 1 259 313 
2012 1 790 685 
To June 2013 789 398 
Source: Australian Signals Directorate, 12 June 2013. 
Australian Government information security frameworks require national coordination 
for relevant agencies to adequately understand and respond to cyber threats. This 
includes reporting these threats and their treatment to federal parliamentary 
committees. 
In Victoria, the government is not provided with briefings or assessments on cyber 
threats affecting public sector ICT systems. Despite this, there have been recent 
moves to strengthen the oversight and regulation of data security and to better protect 
information held by the public sector. 
On 20 December 2012 the Victorian Government announced that it had decided to 
merge two existing statutory roles—the Victorian Privacy Commissioner and the 
Commissioner for Law Enforcement Data Security—into a new statutory office to be 
known as the Victorian Privacy and Data Protection Commissioner. Legislation is 
expected to be introduced into Parliament in 2013 to give effect to this decision. 
The new commissioner will oversee the current Victorian privacy and law enforcement 
data security regimes and will implement a Victorian Protective Security Policy 
Framework, across the Victorian public sector. 
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Information security will be a key element of the Victorian Protective Security Policy 
Framework and close cooperation will be required between the new Privacy and Data 
Protection Commissioner and central agencies with lead responsibilities for information 
security. 
1.3 Governance arrangements 
A restructure of the Victorian public service was announced by the Premier on 
9 April 2013 and implemented on 1 July 2013. This had a direct impact on the 
implementation of the government ICT strategy which came into effect on 
9 February 2013. 
DTF was responsible for the government’s ICT strategy until the appointment of the 
Chief Technology Advocate for Victoria in April 2013. 
Until 1 July 2013, DTF was also the department responsible for developing and 
overseeing information security policy, standards and guidelines as well as being the 
operational lead agency to receive and disseminate cyber threat assessments. 
From 1 July 2013, all operational ICT matters, including strategy, information security 
policy, standards and guidelines became a Department of State Development, 
Business and Innovation (DSDBI) responsibility. 
The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) is responsible for coordinating a 
whole-of-government approach to critical hazards and has an interest in cyber security 
as part of its duty to monitor critical hazards to citizens and state assets. 
1.4 Audit objective and scope 
1.4.1 Objective 
The audit objective was to assess the effectiveness of ICT security policy, standards 
and protection mechanisms for the state’s ICT systems and data. 
To address this objective, the audit examined whether: 
x appropriate information security policy direction and guidance was in place to 
provide consistent protection to state ICT systems and data 
x central agencies have oversight of, and coordinate responses to, WoVG 
information and system threats  
x selected agencies had established and complied with information security policy, 
standards and processes. 
1.4.2 Scope 
The audit involved the following central agencies: 
x the Department of Premier and Cabinet 
x the Department of State Development, Business and Innovation  
x the Department of Treasury and Finance. 
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We also tested ICT frameworks and systems in the following agencies: 
x CenITex, an inner WoVG agency and the provider of ICT infrastructure services 
to all departments, except for the Department of Education and Early Childhood 
Development 
x three DTF portfolio agencies which have ICT systems critical to the state’s 
revenue and financial assets: 
x State Revenue Office—an inner WoVG agency  
x Treasury Corporation of Victoria—an outer WoVG agency 
x Victorian Funds Management Corporation—an outer WoVG agency  
x IT Shared Solutions, which provides a shared ICT data centre, a network, and 
end-user services for two outer WoVG agencies—WorkSafe Victoria and the 
Transport Accident Commission. 
Two CenITex client departments were added to the audit in June 2013: 
x the Department of Human Services 
x the Department of Justice. 
1.4.3 Review of agency compliance 
VAGO appointed an independent specialist information security advisor to assist in 
reviewing whether agencies’ policy, standards and processes comply with government 
policy and standards. 
The advisor also conducted internal and external penetration testing of selected 
agency ICT systems under VAGO's supervision. 
The independent specialist information security advisor assisted with the evaluation of 
agencies' compliance with relevant information security policy, standards and 
processes. 
The approach used for this assessment involved:  
x reviewing each agency's information security documentation 
x identifying appropriate ICT systems for penetration testing by reviewing the key 
management and system control linkages described in the agencies' information 
security management frameworks (ISMF), analysis of self-assessments of these 
frameworks, critical information infrastructure reports and interviews with key 
officers 
x reviewing any previous penetration test results 
x conducting penetration testing of the selected system(s) 
x reviewing management and system control reactions to weaknesses found with 
agencies’ ISMFs and interviews with key officers 
x developing conclusions as to how the agency would react to a credible and 
realistic threat situation. 
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1.4.4 Applicability of policy and standards 
Inner WoVG agencies are required to comply with government policy, standards and 
guidelines, while outer WoVG agencies are not. However, each of the outer WoVG 
agencies audited had developed some information security policy and standards.  
As part of this audit we reviewed each of their relevant documents against best 
practice principles, standards and controls, such as international information security 
standards and published frameworks.  
1.5 Audit method and cost 
Methods used for this audit included interviews with staff, direct observation and 
testing of operational ICT systems, and analysis of documents and data from agencies 
and other sources. 
The audit was conducted under section 15 of the Audit Act 1994 and in accordance 
with the Australian Auditing and Assurance Standards.  
Pursuant to section 20(3) of the Audit Act 1994, unless otherwise indicated, any 
persons named in this report are not the subject of adverse comment or opinion. 
The total cost of the audit was $575 000. 
1.6 Structure of the report 
This report is structured as follows: 
x Part 2 examines whether appropriate information security policy direction and 
guidance is in place to provide consistent protection to state ICT systems and 
data. 
x Part 3 examines whether central agencies have adequate oversight of, and 
coordinate responses to, WoVG information and system threats. 
x Part 4 examines whether selected agencies have established and complied with 
information security policy, standards and processes.  
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2 Appropriateness of policy direction and guidance  
At a glance  
Background  
Victoria's information security policy, standards and processes are aligned with the 
Australian Government's information security frameworks.  
Inner Whole-of-Victorian-Government (WoVG) agencies are required to comply with 
these standards by implementing their own information security management 
framework (ISMF) and reporting on their information security performance annually. 
Conclusion 
An appropriate information security policy and framework is in place, but it only applies 
to 20 inner WoVG agencies. Other public sector entities, including the outer WoVG 
agencies in this audit, are not required to conform to any specific policy or standard. 
Findings  
x Central agencies with a lead role in information security have adequately guided 
the inner WoVG agencies to implement information security frameworks, but 
have not overseen the adequacy of inner WoVG agency ISMF implementation. 
x Outer WoVG agencies have received no central agency guidance or support on 
information security matters. 
x Agencies need to make sure their annual ISMF reports reflect the true status of 
information systems, including those provided by third party shared services. 
Recommendations  
The Department of State Development, Business and Innovation should: 
x send the information security management policy to government for formal 
consideration 
x mandate information security policy and standards across public sector agencies 
where the consequences of a security failure are significant for the state. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Between October and December 2012, the Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF) 
refreshed previous policies and standards for information security and published them 
in a suite of policy and framework documents. 
These have been progressively implemented for inner Whole-of-Victorian-Government 
(WoVG) agencies but have never been considered by government or announced as 
official policy.  
Inner WoVG agencies are required to develop an information security management 
framework (ISMF) based on the current standard and tailored for their particular 
activities. 
Each agency’s ISMF includes an annual self-assessment report which is consolidated 
with other inner WoVG agency reports. This allows the Department of State 
Development, Business and Innovation (DSDBI) to oversee the information security 
status of agency information and communications technology (ICT) systems. 
Outer WoVG agencies are not required to develop an ISMF, nor are they required to 
provide any reporting. 
2.2 Conclusion 
There is an appropriate information security framework in place for inner WoVG 
agencies. For these agencies, correct application of the framework would provide a 
satisfactory level of assurance. 
However, no information security policy or framework has been presented to or 
endorsed by government. 
Apart from certain reporting requirements for inner WoVG agencies and a program of 
training and briefings, there was no evidence that central agencies took any initiative to 
help these agencies apply the policy and framework. 
Inner WoVG agencies need to be more rigorous in their self-assessment process. In 
particular, agencies using third party shared service providers need to be sure the 
report reflects both the status of their systems, and those provided by third parties. 
DSDBI should review the self-assessment template and improve the questions in order 
to gain a more comprehensive overview of the status of Victoria’s information security. 
Agencies should also be required to certify statements of compliance to address 
reported deficiencies. 
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2.3 Governance 
DTF was responsible for developing and overseeing information security policy, 
standards and guidelines until 1 July 2013. 
DTF developed a refreshed suite of inner WoVG agency policy, standards and 
processes for information security that aligned with the Australian Government 
Protective Security Policy Framework and Information Security Manual. The refreshed 
Victorian policy and standards were released progressively from October 2012.   
Neither the current Victorian information security policy nor its predecessor released in 
2005 has ever been presented to government. The importance of information security 
means that, at a minimum, a policy of this nature should be submitted for formal 
government consideration to avoid any ambiguity in its application. 
DSDBI became responsible for implementing information security arrangements from 
1 July 2013. This means that all operational ICT matters including strategy, information 
security policy, standards and guidelines are now a DSDBI responsibility. 
2.4 Coordination and communication of policy, 
standards and templates 
2.4.1 Inner WoVG agencies 
There is effective communication of information security policy, standards and 
templates across inner WoVG agencies. The existence of the policy and standards is 
well known in these agencies because they are members of the Chief Information 
Officer Council, which has endorsed the information security policy. 
The government has noted that the Chief Information Officer Council is the senior 
executive coordination and collaboration body for ICT in the Victorian public sector, 
responsible for ICT architectures, policies and standards, and operational ICT issues. 
All inner WoVG agencies were also involved in an extensive program of information 
security training that DTF implemented and managed. 
The current standards clearly set out inner WoVG agency responsibilities and how 
these are to be implemented. They document clear roles, responsibilities and 
accountabilities, and detail what is required of each inner WoVG agency in terms of its 
ISMF. 
This approach provides a clear governance structure for the implementation of 
information security policy in the inner WoVG agencies for which it applies. 
Inner WoVG agencies are required to submit certain reports annually to DSDBI that 
are intended to provide central oversight of the ability of these agencies' ICT systems 
to perform in a cyber threat environment. DSDBI is required to consolidate these 
reports and in turn report to the Deputy Secretary Leadership Group. 
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DSDBI does not critique agency ISMFs and agencies are not required to provide their 
ISMF to DSDBI. Given the relatively low level of maturity in information security in 
Victoria, this approach should be reviewed. 
2.4.2 Outer WoVG agencies 
There is no coordination and communication by DSDBI on information security matters 
with outer WoVG agencies. These agencies do not receive support from central 
agencies on information security matters.  
There was also no expectation that agencies develop internal policy and standards, 
nor was there any guidance on how these agencies should address their information 
security requirements. 
This is a significant weakness in DSDBI’s overall knowledge of agency capability and 
visibility of risk to government services. This situation is unlikely to be unique to the 
outer WoVG agencies included in this audit. Outer WoVG agencies are individually 
responsible for determining whether their governance arrangements are adequate. 
The other consequences for outer WoVG agencies are that they: 
x are not required to report on the status of their ICT systems with respect to 
information security 
x have no opportunity to share cyber alert information 
x have inconsistent approaches to preparing and implementing their agency ISMF. 
So, from a government and central agency viewpoint there is: 
x no assurance that outer WoVG agencies are addressing information security 
matters 
x no visibility of areas where assistance could be provided to minimise the cyber 
threat risk 
x no ability to assess the risk posed to outer WoVG agency ICT systems in a 
hostile cyber threat environment 
x no easy way to develop a whole-of-government current threat assessment and 
risk profile. 
The current arrangements are insufficient. The four outer WoVG agencies audited are 
each responsible for significant sources of state revenue and control billions of dollars 
of financial assets. 
Information security policy and standards should be mandated—not only for inner 
WoVG agencies, but also those outer WoVG agencies that operate ICT systems that 
have an aggregate high transactional value critical to state revenue, systems critical to 
public safety, or systems holding sensitive personal data with potential value to third 
parties. 
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2.5 Level of assurance for agencies 
The current policy and standards would, if fully applied within agencies, provide a 
satisfactory level of assurance of an agency's ability to protect its data and reduce the 
risk of inappropriate release of information or unauthorised access to its ICT systems. 
The lack of any specific information security guidance for outer WoVG agencies 
conflicts with the 2009 VAGO report recommendations previously accepted by DTF 
and the Department of Premier and Cabinet. 
While not required to develop an ISMF, outer WoVG agencies are required to manage 
their information security risks in line with the Victorian Government Risk Management 
Framework. This requires that all departments and public sector agencies adopt a 
widely accepted best practice approach to make sure that their risks (including ICT 
risks) are being effectively managed. 
While no government information security policies or standards apply to outer WoVG 
agencies, each outer WoVG agency selected for this audit had developed its own 
policy and standards. 
These documents were subjected to detailed review as part of the audit process and 
our findings are included in Parts 3 and 4 of this report. 
2.6 Information security management framework 
requirements 
The information security standard requires inner WoVG agencies to develop an ISMF 
which shows progression over time towards compliance with the Australian 
Government Protective Security Policy Framework and Information Security Manual.   
Both documents relate to ICT information, people, processes and assets including 
software, equipment and computer rooms.  
The standard requires each inner WoVG agency ISMF to have four key documents: 
x an ICT risk assessment report on the agency's ICT information, people, 
processes and assets 
x an agency information security policy  
x an ISMF self-assessment report and a compliance plan developed to address 
any significant non compliance issues 
x an incident response plan with mandatory use of the Australian Signals 
Directorate online reporting application. 
In April 2010, DTF briefed the Deputy Secretary Leadership Group (DSLG) that it 
would review each inner WoVG agency policy and their practices as part of a program 
of work known as DSLG 2.0. Inner WoVG agency information security policies were 
reviewed in 2010, but there was little evidence of any oversight of agency standards, 
controls and compliance since then.  
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Inner WoVG agencies selected for this audit said that they had not been asked to 
provide their policy and incident response plans and were only required to submit 
self-assessment and critical information infrastructure reports. 
Outer WoVG agencies were not required to have an ISMF. 
2.6.1 Agency self-assessment reports 
Inner WoVG agencies are required to submit an annual ISMF self-assessment 
compliance report in May each year from 2013 onwards, with a special first report 
required in December 2012 to initiate the process. 
We reviewed both the December 2012 and May 2013 self-assessment reports and 
noted: 
x not all inner WoVG agencies had provided reports  
x little difference existed between the two successive reports 
x the questions in the template were vague and did not provide a comprehensive 
status of an agency’s information security. 
DSDBI is required to summarise the self-assessment reports and brief the DSLG. This 
occurred after the December 2012 and May 2013 reports were received. 
Where agencies use a shared service provider for their ICT systems, we noted 
significant shortcomings in the accuracy of ISMF reports. This is because there is little 
sharing of information on ICT systems and applications to ensure the completeness of 
the reports. 
As a consequence, agencies were completing their ISMF without knowing the extent of 
any problems with ICT systems on which their applications and data were being 
hosted. 
There is a need for inner WoVG agencies to: 
x more rigorously complete their ISMF self-assessment report  
x make sure agency statements of compliance reflect all non-complying issues in 
the ISMF self-assessment report 
x make sure that, where any of their ICT services are provided by third party 
shared service providers, self-assessment reports include any provider problems 
that will have an impact on the agency's ability to deliver services. 
DSDBI should improve the questions on the ISMF self-assessment report template to 
provide a more comprehensive overview. DSDBI should also require agencies to 
certify that their statements of compliance address all deficiencies in their ISMF 
self-assessment reports.  
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Recommendations 
The Department of State Development, Business and Innovation should: 
1. send the information security management policy to government for formal 
consideration 
2. amend information security policy and standards to include those outer WoVG 
agencies operating information and communications technology systems that 
have an aggregate high transaction value critical to state revenue, systems 
critical to public safety, or systems holding sensitive personal data with potential 
value to third parties 
3. require WoVG agencies to report any variations between the information security 
standards and their agency information security management frameworks, that 
have been approved by their agency head, as part of the annual information 
security management framework self-assessment reporting process 
4. require that each agency information security management framework 
self-assessment report includes a statement of compliance addressing all 
self-assessment report deficiencies 
5. develop processes for outer WoVG agencies to be included in relevant briefings 
and information security forums, and to be provided with advice and assistance 
outside of the WoVG Chief Information Officers Council 
6. improve the current information security management framework  
self-assessment report template to ensure a more comprehensive outcome. 
Departments and agencies included in this audit should: 
7. take a more rigorous approach to completing their annual information security 
management framework self-assessment report 
8. make sure their annual self-assessment reports reflect the true status and risk to 
agency business from any third party service providers they may use. 
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3 Oversight and coordination of information security threats 
At a glance  
Background  
The Department of State Development, Business and Innovation (DSDBI) receives 
cyber alerts from Australian Government agencies and distributes them to relevant 
Victorian agencies.  
Agencies are responsible for registering their internet protocol (IP) addresses with the 
regional registrar. The Australian Signals Directorate and other agencies use this 
registry to identify operators of networks facing a potential cyber threat. 
Conclusion 
Because agencies’ reports on cyber attacks they have experienced are not 
consolidated, there is no central repository for government to analyse the type or 
incidence of cyber threats or the ability of systems to resist cyber attacks. 
Cyber alerts depend on accurate IP information. DSDBI and individual agencies are 
not managing IP information to ensure correct and current information is available. This 
is essential for an effective response to detected cyber threats. 
Findings  
x There is neither a central, consolidated view of cyber threats, nor arrangements 
in place to brief government in the event of a multi-agency or sustained attack.  
x DSDBI and individual agencies are not managing IP information to ensure correct 
and current information is available to cyber threat response agencies. 
Recommendations 
x The departments of Premier and Cabinet, and State Development, Business and 
Innovation should confirm their respective roles and responsibilities.  
x The Department of State Development, Business and Innovation should: 
x establish an information security incident prevention and monitoring service 
for all government agencies  
x maintain an accurate and current registry of IP addresses in use by 
government agencies to assist in effective response to cyber threats. 
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3.1 Introduction 
All states and territories have nominated a single point of contact to receive Australian 
Government cyber alerts. In Victoria, the Department of State Development, Business 
and Innovation (DSDBI) receives these cyber alert reports from Australian Government 
agencies and distributes them to relevant Victorian agencies.  
Agencies experiencing serious cyber attacks are required to report these attacks to the 
Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) using ASD's online OnSecure incident reporting 
application. 
Agencies are responsible for registering their internet protocol (IP) addresses with the 
regional registrar. ASD and other agencies use this registry to identify operators of 
networks which they suspect may be facing a potential cyber threat and then generate 
cyber alert reports accordingly. 
3.2 Conclusion 
Central agencies currently neither oversee nor coordinate responses to cyber threats 
targeted at public sector information and systems. However, as now advised by the 
Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC), this is expected to change with the 
formation of the State Crisis and Resilience Council (SCRC) once the Emergency 
Management Bill 2013 passes into legislation.  
DSDBI distributes cyber alerts it receives from the Australian Government but does not 
coordinate any responses. 
Agencies experiencing serious cyber attacks report these to ASD but not to DSDBI or 
DPC. As a consequence, there is no monitoring of the status of the ‘live’ cyber threat 
scenario or an understanding of systems’ ability to resist cyber attack. 
Further, DSDBI and individual agencies are not meeting their responsibilities to 
maintain correct and current IP address information. IP information is critical to cyber 
alert assessment because it identifies an incident and the information communications 
technology (ICT) systems under threat. We found a number of discrepancies between 
agency IP addresses in use, those registered and those included in lists. 
3.3 Lack of central oversight 
A significant difference between the policy and standards of the Victorian Government 
and the Australian Government is that federal agencies involved in information security 
have effective central coordination arrangements to oversee the threat and keep 
government informed. 
A concerted attack on multiple agency ICT systems has the potential to be 
catastrophic, but there is no mechanism in Victoria to collect reports on such an attack 
beyond individual agencies reporting incidents to Australian Government agencies. 
Oversight and coordination of information security threats 
Victorian Auditor-General’s Report  WoVG Information Security Management Framework        17 
DPC is responsible for coordinating a whole-of-government approach to critical 
hazards and has an interest in cyber security as part of its oversight of critical hazards 
to state assets and citizens. 
DPC has advised that it did not have a role in coordinating a whole-of-government 
approach to cyber threats and that individual agencies were responsible for their own 
information security arrangements. However, this position will change following the 
introduction of the Emergency Management Bill 2013 into Parliament on 
31 October 2013.  
The Bill establishes the SCRC which comprises all departmental secretaries and is 
chaired by the Secretary of DPC. Briefings on the cyber threat would be made to the 
SCRC by DSDBI as the agency with primary responsibility for 
Whole-of-Victorian-Government (WoVG) ICT matters. The SCRC would in turn 
recommend briefings for ministers as appropriate.  
3.4 Cyber alerts 
3.4.1 Australian Signals Directorate cyber alert 
arrangements 
Victoria, like other Australian states, relies on national security agencies to provide it 
with credible and realistic cyber alerts. DSDBI receives and distributes information and 
system threat alerts from the ASD Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) in the 
form of general or specific alerts. 
DSDBI distributes these alerts in accordance with Standard Operating Procedure – 
Distribution of Commonwealth Government Cyber Security Alerts, dated 
28 March 2013. The procedure sets out the formats in which to convey cyber alert 
details to agencies, including distribution arrangements. 
DSDBI's distribution lists include all inner WoVG agencies and certain libraries, 
educational institutions and museums. Surprisingly, they do not include most of the 
outer WoVG agencies. 
DSDBI—and prior to 1 July 2013, the Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF)—
has not been coordinating agency responses to cyber alerts or overseeing reporting 
arrangements by agencies, as it does not believe that there is any need for this type of 
oversight and coordination. DSDBI's view is consistent with the position taken by DTF. 
The current procedure requires that inner WoVG agencies experiencing a cyber 
incident make mandatory information security incident reports to ASD in accordance 
with their incident response plan. These reports are submitted via the ASD's online 
OnSecure incident reporting application. ASD then provides a six-monthly report to 
DSDBI, which then submits it to the Chief Information Officer Council for consideration.  
Oversight and coordination of information security threats 
 
18       WoVG Information Security Management Framework Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
This could mean that there is no central agency oversight of serious incidents until 
six months after the event, and then the incident is only referred to the Chief 
Information Officer Council for its ‘consideration’.  
Victorian departments routinely experience cyber security incidents. Some agencies 
are detecting thousands of intrusion attempts per month, which range from minor 
errors when entering user names or passwords to serious attacks.  
In 2012, inner WoVG agencies experienced 26 serious cyber threat incidents, of which 
half were reported by agencies to the CSOC. In the first six months of 2013, the 
Victorian and West Australian state governments accounted for the highest proportion 
of cyber security incidents reported to the CSOC. Common incidents included login 
credentials being stolen and published on websites frequented by cyber criminals and 
hackers, malicious code being used in online applications to trick a user or hijack a 
session, website defacement and malicious emails with embedded links or 
attachments. 
3.4.2 Alternative cyber alert arrangements 
In addition to the CSOC cyber alert arrangements, inner WoVG agencies and some 
outer WoVG agencies subscribe to a service provided by the Australian Computer 
Emergency Response Team, which provides updates on emerging threats and 
vulnerabilities, and recommendations on how to mitigate these. 
The subscriber service includes continuous monitoring of external domain addresses 
and a response to any intrusions. A weekly report is sent to each subscriber agency. 
Prior to 2011, this service was centrally funded by DTF but inner WoVG agencies now 
directly pay for the service. This new arrangement is unnecessarily complicated. 
A single arrangement for all Victorian Government ICT systems would be more 
practical and effective, and potentially cheaper. 
3.4.3 Internet protocol address information 
Accurate IP address information is critical to the cyber alert assessment process. 
Cyber security alerts rely on the accuracy of IP address information to identify an 
incident and the ICT system under threat. 
The Standard Operating Procedure – Distribution of Commonwealth Government 
Cyber Security Alerts gives the responsibility of managing Victoria's public sector IP 
addresses to DSDBI. Individual agencies are responsible for maintaining correct 
information with the Asia-Pacific National Internet Centre (APNIC) 'Whois' database. 
APNIC is the regional internet registry for the Asia-Pacific region. 
The maintenance of accurate IP address information is important because cyber 
security alerts relating to or based on IP addresses are validated by the Australian 
Government against the APNIC database. 
If IP addresses are wrong then alert information will not be able to be distributed to the 
correct ICT system operator.  
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We found a number of discrepancies between agency IP addresses in use, those 
registered and those included in lists. 
Recommendations 
The Department of Premier and Cabinet, and the Department of State Development, 
Business and Innovation should: 
9. confirm their respective roles and responsibilities for information security once the 
Emergency Management Bill 2013 is enacted 
10. confirm that briefings on cyber threats will be made to the State Crisis and 
Resilience Council by the Department of State Development, Business and 
Innovation as the agency with primary responsibility for WoVG information and 
communications technology, and that the State Crisis and Resilience Council will 
in turn recommend briefings for ministers as appropriate.  
The Department of State Development, Business and Innovation should: 
11. arrange for a cyber alert subscription service to be available to every government 
agency from a suitable provider  
12. develop and implement a process for maintaining a register of all IP addresses in 
use by public sector departments and agencies. 
Departments and agencies included in this audit should: 
13. implement appropriate action to maintain the accuracy of their IP address 
information with the Asia-Pacific National Internet Centre. 
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4 Agency compliance with policy, standards and 
process requirements 
At a glance 
Background  
Each of the 20 inner Whole-of-Victorian-Government (WoVG) agencies is required to 
develop its own information security management framework (ISMF), providing its 
agency with appropriate policy direction and guidance. There is no requirement for 
outer WoVG agencies to conform to any specified standard for their own agency ISMF. 
Conclusion 
All of the audited agencies had some information security policy and procedures in 
place. Compliance with these policies was better for inner WoVG agencies than outer 
WoVG agencies. 
All examined agencies had previously conducted penetration tests—a method of 
testing for vulnerabilities—on their information communications technology (ICT) 
systems. Some of these tests were narrowly scoped and there were instances of 
previously identified problems not having been addressed. 
Overall, there is a low level of awareness of how an agency's ICT systems are likely to 
perform if subjected to a cyber attack. 
Findings  
x The audited inner WoVG agencies have reasonably well developed ISMFs.  
x Outer WoVG agencies are less advanced with their information security policies. 
x Centrally sponsored training has had a positive impact on inner WoVG agencies. 
x Penetration testing of ICT systems is inconsistent and too narrowly focused.  
Recommendations 
All public sector agencies in Victoria should:  
x urgently implement the Australian Signals Directorate Top 4 Strategies to Mitigate 
Targeted Cyber Intrusions 
x retain responsibility for managing and allocating passwords if third party service 
providers are used. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Currently, only the 20 inner Whole-of-Victorian-Government (WoVG) agencies are 
required to develop and implement an information security management framework 
(ISMF) that conforms to the published public sector standards.  
All other Victorian outer WoVG agencies are not covered by these requirements. It is 
up to each of these agencies to separately develop and apply a framework to protect 
the systems they control or information they hold. 
4.2 Conclusion 
None of the agencies included in this audit has fully complied with government 
information security policy and standards. However, each of the audited agencies did 
have some information security policy in place. 
The two inner WoVG agencies subjected to penetration testing for this audit had 
achieved partial compliance but did not have a plan in place to achieve a fully 
compliant ISMF. 
The outer WoVG agencies had commenced using international standards as a basis 
for development of an ISMF but none had a complete ISMF in place. 
All agencies had undertaken penetration testing of their information and 
communications technology (ICT) systems. Some of these tests were too narrowly 
scoped and there were multiple instances of previously identified problems not having 
been remediated. There was also little evidence that they tested all of their ICT 
systems. 
Overall awareness of how public sector ICT systems would perform if subjected to a 
cyber attack is unsatisfactory. Closer central agency involvement is necessary until an 
acceptable level of information security maturity is reached across public sector 
agencies. 
4.3 Developing and applying an effective 
information security framework  
4.3.1 Inner WoVG agencies 
Inner WoVG agencies had developed a range of internal standards, controls and 
compliance arrangements based on published Department of Treasury and Finance 
(DTF) standards—now published by the Department of State Development, Business 
and Innovation (DSDBI). 
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However, there were several examples of the application of these standards being 
inadequate and incomplete in the audited agencies: 
x An agency had not based its ISMF on the relevant mandatory standards and had 
no formal plans to address this. While there is a provision for agencies to seek 
approval for non compliance, there is no evidence that this protocol had been 
followed. It is difficult to understand why, in this instance, the agency did not 
simply conform to expected requirements instead of making a huge effort to 
develop their own approach. 
x Another agency had principles and guidelines published as an ICT policy. The 
document did not clearly articulate the organisation’s intent and expectations, and 
consequently was of limited value.   
x An agency’s reasonably well developed ISMF had not been effectively 
communicated or embedded in the organisation. During an interview with a key 
manager, it was clear that they were not aware of policy relating to urgent 
software patching requirements. When shown the agency policy, the manager 
stated that they had not seen the policy before.  
Although the information security standards require policy deviations to be managed, 
none of the inner WoVG agencies had plans to manage this, and none of the 
examined agencies maintain registers of non compliance.  
In some instances inner WoVG agencies are reliant on third parties for the provision of 
certain services. Agencies are required to take account of any deficiencies in the third 
party provider’s services in completing their ISMF self-assessments. This requires 
close cooperation with the third party provider which was not always evident. Agencies 
using third party shared services should ensure that the contractual arrangements 
provide for the required level of cooperation to accommodate ISMF requirements and 
commitments.   
4.3.2 Outer WoVG agencies 
Outer WoVG agencies took a responsible approach to information security and were 
genuinely concerned about protecting their systems from cyber threats.  
However, these agencies were less advanced with their information security policy 
implementation, in part because they are not driven and guided by the DTF framework 
—now DSDBI. 
Only one outer WoVG agency had a documented, stand-alone ISMF. For other 
agencies, policy documentation was embedded within ICT procedure documentation, 
which was not easily accessible to agency management or staff. 
Only one of the four audited outer WoVG agencies was aware of the DSDBI policy and 
standards, and two agencies were aware of the Australian Government 
documentation. All were aware of the ISO 27000 series of international information 
security standards. 
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All audited outer WoVG agencies indicated that some level of guidance and assistance 
from DTF, and DSDBI since 1 July 2013, would have helped these agencies apply 
consistent and comprehensive standards and better understand what was expected of 
them. 
4.4 Australian Signals Directorate strategies 
The DTF framework—now DSDBI—mandates that inner WoVG agencies should 
implement the Australian Signals Directorate’s (ASD) Top 4 Strategies to Mitigate 
Targeted Cyber Intrusions. These are a set of strategies that ASD claims prevent at 
least 85 per cent of targeted cyber intrusions. 
The ‘Top 4 Strategies’ are:  
x use application ‘whitelisting’ to help prevent malicious software and other 
unapproved programs from running 
x maintain up-to-date software patches for applications such as PDF readers, 
Microsoft Office, Java, Flash Player and web browsers 
x maintain up-to-date patches of operating systems 
x minimise the number of users with administrative privileges. 
This section examines how well these strategies have been applied, finding significant 
weaknesses that both inner and outer WoVG agencies need to address. 
4.4.1 Application ‘whitelisting’ 
An application ‘whitelist’ is a list of applications permitted to run on a device. It is 
designed to protect against the activation of unauthorised and malicious programs. 
Two of the six audited agencies used application whitelists. 
Agencies should review the whitelisting guidelines published on the ASD website and 
develop and implement a whitelisting strategy.  
4.4.2 Patching of applications and patching of operating 
systems 
A patch is a piece of software designed to fix security vulnerabilities and other bugs, or 
to improve the usability or performance of an application or operating system. 
We identified: 
x examples in all agencies of ineffective patching and system configuration issues, 
resulting in systems being exposed to risk 
x a rolling three- and six-month patching strategy in one agency that could not 
accommodate urgent patches  
x agencies using unsupported operating systems and software 
x agencies not having well developed processes to review the severity of issues 
and the applicability of vendor provided patches. 
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The audit identified patching issues at all examined agencies. The biggest impediment 
to patching appeared to be a lack of resources to test the impact of vendor patches on 
agency networks and software applications.  
This practice is concerning as it does not take into account the implications of the 
rapidly changing cyber threat environment faced by public sector ICT systems. 
Agencies should review patching guidelines published on the ASD website and 
develop, implement or review their patching strategy.  
4.4.3 Administrative privileges 
User accounts with administrative privileges are a key target for hackers because they 
permit high-level access to an organisation’s systems, including any data the 
administrator can access, which generally means ‘everything’.  
We found that the management of privileged access by key users was poor across all 
agencies: 
x Only one agency used an application to manage its privileged passwords.  
x Management of privileged accounts was ad hoc, lacked procedures and was 
manually applied, if at all.  
x In one agency, some 70 per cent of staff had privileged access to systems, and 
such access was generally allocated permanently rather than on an ‘as required’ 
basis. 
x In a number of cases, passwords for privileged accounts were simple and easy to 
guess. 
During penetration testing for this audit, a number of password lists were found and 
used to gain access to user accounts. Audit testing: 
x found passwords in an unprotected file that allowed access to an account held on 
behalf of the agency with an overseas financial institution 
x easily hacked a local administrative password, which could have permitted 
access to and control of some 6 000 computing devices on a network 
x found some passwords to be of poor strength and low complexity. 
A number of agencies included in the audit used third party service providers for some 
of their services. In all cases the provider was responsible for allocating passwords 
and for managing their ongoing use. This is a risky practice as it relies on the integrity 
of organisations which the agency cannot oversee. Where third party providers are 
used, agencies should retain management and allocation of all passwords.  
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4.5 Additional internal vulnerabilities 
Internal vulnerabilities are typically weaknesses in security that allow attacks from 
insiders such as staff, contractors, vendors and hackers who have gained internal 
network access. 
We found examples of system vulnerability that included: 
x use of an unauthorised laptop on a password controlled network, allowing the 
penetration testing team to access a department’s secure environment, which 
contained sensitive applications and personal information 
x widespread use of memory devices such as DVD/CD burners and USB memory 
sticks, with no ability to detect what data had been copied onto them from the 
system 
x widespread and uncontrolled access to social media and email websites.  
To manage the social media risk, the State Revenue Office has developed an 
application to manage social media and email website access. The approach shown in 
Figure 4A could be applied across all government agencies. 
  Figure 4A
Managing social media and personal email access 
Social media and personal webmail present a potential security threat.  
Confidential information can leak through these channels, and security can be 
compromised through links to other sites and material entering systems through them as 
well.  
Staff may want to use these sites while at work, in accordance with the organisation’s 
acceptable use policy. To make this possible, and at the same time improve data security, 
an ICT solution was developed that would achieve both outcomes.  
Regular internet access was restricted so that social media and webmail could not be 
accessed. Instead, a new icon was deployed on desktop computers through which staff 
could have access to these sites.  
This icon was named the Protected Internet Access (PIA) environment. It connects to an 
internet browser window with no access to the internal network.  
When in the PIA, staff are prevented from attaching and sending agency files, printing, or 
copying/pasting data from their desktop or the agency network into social networking sites 
and webmail. As with regular internet access, the PIA environment is monitored and 
controlled for acceptable use. 
An unexpected benefit of implementing the PIA was a 70 per cent reduction in the use of 
the internet for non-business purposes. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office using State Revenue Office information. 
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4.6 Agency penetration testing 
Penetration testing is a method of testing for vulnerabilities within an ICT system in 
order to gain access to critical data, simulating what an attacker might be able to do. 
The results expose possible security weaknesses in a system as well as testing its 
ability to detect and prevent attacks.  
While all audited agencies conducted penetration testing in the past 12 months, we 
found problems with the scope of penetration testing, particularly: 
x inconsistency in the nature and level of penetration testing 
x multiple examples of problems identified from previous penetration testing not 
having been remediated 
x narrow testing scopes that focus too much on systems already known to be 
satisfactory. 
Many of the detailed findings arising from fieldwork for this audit are sensitive to the 
security of public sector ICT systems and it is therefore not in the public interest to 
include them in this report. 
However, to make sure that agencies take appropriate steps to address observed 
weaknesses and breaches, the Auditor-General has issued management letters to 
each agency subject to this audit. The letters set out recommended actions and 
seeking a response from the agencies indicating their acceptance, as well as their 
intended actions and time frames.  
The detailed management letters contain 58 issues resulting in 111 recommended 
actions. The breakdown of the recommended actions is in Figure 4B.   
Figure 4B 
Recommended actions in management letters agreed with agencies 
Agency(a) 
Recommended actions 
Agreed 
with 
agency 
Critical level 
completed by 
agency 
Medium 
level 
completed 
by agency 
Critical-level 
risk(b) 
Medium-level 
risk(c) Total 
Agency 1 – 11 11 11 – 2 
Agency 2 3 12 15 15 3 4 
Agency 3 – 14 14 14 – 6 
Agency 4 3 9 12 12 3 3 
Agency 5 6 35 41 35 2 2 
Agency 6 – 18 18 12 – – 
Total 12 99 111 99 8 17 
(a) Due to security sensitivities the relevant agencies have been de-identified. 
(b) A critical-level risk is a high information security risk which requires an urgent assessment of the 
risk and implementation of mitigating controls. 
(c) A medium-level risk is a moderate- or long-term information security risk which should be assessed 
and mitigating controls implemented as soon as possible. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
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VAGO will periodically examine whether these findings are being remediated over an 
acceptable time frame and may, at its discretion, report to Parliament on progress at a 
future date. 
Recommendations 
All public sector agencies in Victoria should:  
14. review the Australian Signals Directorate Top 4 Strategies to Mitigate Targeted 
Cyber Intrusions, and implement these practices as a matter of urgency 
15. retain responsibility for managing and allocating passwords if third party service 
providers are used 
16. review the patching guidelines published on the Australian Signals Directorate’s 
website and develop, implement or review their patching strategy. 
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Appendix A. 
Audit Act 1994 section 16—
submissions and comments 
Introduction 
In accordance with section 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994, a copy of this report was 
provided to the named departments and agencies with a request for submissions or 
comments. 
The submissions and comments provided are not subject to audit nor the evidentiary 
standards required to reach an audit conclusion. Responsibility for the accuracy, 
fairness and balance of those comments rests solely with the agency head. 
Responses were received as follows: 
Department of State Development, Business and Innovation ..................................... 30 
CenITex ....................................................................................................................... 33 
Department of Human Services .................................................................................. 34 
Department of Justice  ................................................................................................ 35 
Department of Premier and Cabinet ........................................................................... 38 
Department of Treasury and Finance .......................................................................... 40 
Treasury Corporation of Victoria  ................................................................................ 41 
Transport Accident Commission and WorkSafe  ......................................................... 42 
State Revenue Office  ................................................................................................. 44  
Victorian Funds Management Corporation ................................................................. 45 
 
Further audit comment: 
Auditor-General’s response to the Department of State Development, Business and 
Innovation .................................................................................................................... 32 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of State Development, 
Business and Innovation 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of State Development, 
Business and Innovation – continued 
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Auditor-General’s response to the Department of State 
Development, Business and Innovation 
Despite the Department of State Development, Business and Innovation (DSDBI) 
accepting the finding underpinning Recommendation 15, DSDBI has proposed an 
alternative approach to implementing it. Since the inception of this audit (9 April 2013) 
DSDBI has never discussed this approach with VAGO until its response of 22 
November 2013. Further, it has provided neither the rationale for this nor detail on the 
nature and content of this approach; including how it will address the audit finding 
related to password issuing controls.  
VAGO remains of the view that agencies need to retain responsibility for managing and 
allocating passwords in order to ensure that agency data is properly protected.  In 
order to be assured that DSDBI's proposed approach will be effective, VAGO will follow 
up on the specific actions that DSDBI proposes to achieve the objective of the 
recommendation.  
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RESPONSE provided by the Chief Executive, CenITex 
   
Appendix A. Audit Act 1994 section 16—submissions and comments 
34       WoVG Information Security Management Framework Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Human Services  
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RESPONSE  provided by the Secretary, Department of Justice 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Justice – continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Justice – continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Premier and Cabinet 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary,  Department of Premier and Cabinet – 
continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Treasury and Finance 
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RESPONSE provided by the Deputy Managing Director/Corporation Secretary, 
Treasury Corporation of Victoria 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chairperson, Transport Accident Commission and 
the Chairperson, Victorian WorkCover Authority 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chairperson, Transport Accident Commission and 
the Chairperson, Victorian WorkCover Authority – continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Commissioner of State Revenue, State Revenue 
Office 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chairman, Victorian Funds Management 
Corporation 
 
 

Auditor-General’s reports 
 
Reports tabled during 2013–14 
 
Report title Date tabled 
Operating Water Infrastructure Using Public Private Partnerships (2013–14:1) August 2013 
Developing Transport Infrastructure and Services for Population Growth Areas 
(2013–14:2) 
August 2013 
Asset Confiscation Scheme (2013–14:3) September 2013 
Managing Telecommunications Usage and Expenditure (2013–14:4) September 2013 
Performance Reporting Systems in Education (2013–14:5) September 2013 
Prevention and Management of Drugs in Prisons (2013–14:6) October 2013 
Implementation of the Strengthening Community Organisations Action Plan  
(2013–14:7) 
October 2013 
Clinical ICT Systems in the Victorian Public Health Sector (2013–14:8) October 2013 
Implementation of the Government Risk Management Framework (2013–14:9) October 2013 
Auditor-General's Report on the Annual Financial Report of the State of Victoria, 
2012–13 (2013–14:10) 
November 2013 
Portfolio Departments and Associated Entities: Results of Audits 2012–13  
(2013–14:11) 
November 2013 
 
VAGO’s website at www.audit.vic.gov.au contains a comprehensive list of all reports issued by VAGO. 
The full text of the reports issued is available at the website.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Availability of reports 
Copies of all reports issued by the Victorian Auditor-General's Office are available 
from: 
x Victorian Government Bookshop  
Level 20, 80 Collins Street  
Melbourne Vic. 3000  
AUSTRALIA 
Phone: 1300 366 356 (local call cost) 
Fax: +61 3 9603 9920 
Email: bookshop@dbi.vic.gov.au 
Website: www.bookshop.vic.gov.au 
x Victorian Auditor-General's Office  
Level 24, 35 Collins Street  
Melbourne Vic. 3000  
AUSTRALIA 
Phone: +61 3 8601 7000   
Fax: +61 3 8601 7010  
Email: comments@audit.vic.gov.au 
Website: www.audit.vic.gov.au 
 
